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The Use of Chloroform by British Army Surgeons
during the Crimean War
HENRY CONNOR*
The use of chloroform during the Crimean War was determined by the opinions and
experience ofmedical staff and by the availability ofchloroform on the battlefields and in
the military hospitals. This paper will begin by reviewing medical opinion on the value of
chloroform in military surgery at the start ofthe war, and after examining the availability
and use of chloroform during the war, it will conclude with an examination of medical
opinion at the end ofthe war. A briefchronology of the major military events is given in
Table 1.
Medical Opinion in the Army at the Start ofthe War
On 12 May 1847, less than six months after the arrival of anaesthesia in Britain, John
Snow delivered a lecture on the use ofether in surgical operations to the medical members
of the United Services Institution.1 In this lecture Snow, with his characteristic insight,
foresaw many of the potential benefits of anaesthesia in military practice. Some ofthese,
which were later to be realized during the Crimean War, have been italicized in the
following quotations from Snow's paper. He argued that
. . . the pain of a surgical operation is greater than that of the wound itself. Whilst the latter is
instantaneous, and its approach unknown, the approach of an operation is seen, and its cuts are
necessarily deliberate; ... The blessing would be great of merely preventing this pain, but I am
firmly convinced that the exhibition ofether will be attended with the still greater advantage of
saving many lives. A great part ofthe danger of an operation consists in the pain ofit, which gives
a shock to the system from which it is sometimes unable to recover. If an operation is performed
during or immediately after an action, the wounded man suffers two shocks together-that of his
wound and that ofthe operation, which although, singly, his frame might sustain, united, perhaps it
cannot. If, on the other hand, a secondary operation, as it is called, has to be performed sometime
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Table I
Chronology ofevents relevant to the text
1854 September 14
20
23
26
October 12
17
25
November 5
14
1855 April 9
June 6
17
August 8
September 8
October }
November
1856 July 12
Allied armies land in the Crimea
Battle of the River Alma
Hall's caution on the use ofchloroform published in the
Illustrated London News
British Army reaches Balaklava
Syme's response to Hall published in The Times
Siege of Sebastopol begins; first bombardment
Battle of Balaklava
Battle of the Inkerman
Great storm at Balaklava
2nd bombardment of Sebastopol
3rd
4th ,. ..
5th ,. ..
Malakoff and Redan redoubts stormed
Minor "cleaning-up" actions and expeditions
Allied armies evacuated from the Crimea
afterwards in the hospital, he is rendered more nervous and susceptible of pain by his illness and
suffering.... I believe that ether will give the surgeon a greater choice in selecting between cases
for immediate and subsequent operation, for dread of the knife helps to cause and keep up the
faintness and collapse, which often prevent the surgeon from operating at once. The ether and
apparatus will not add anything to the necessary baggage, for it will stand in the stead of a much
greater weight ofbrandy.... During the operation it will prevent faintness, which arises more from
pain than loss ofblood, which is seldom great. It usually acts, also, as a stimulate in itself, and I do
not remember to have seen wine or brandy given in the operating theatre of St George's Hospital
more than once since January.
Snow went on to describe some of the operations, for which he had anaesthetized,
which were of particular relevance to military surgeons. There were twelve amputations
(thigh 8; leg 2; forearm 2), with two deaths, both after thigh amputations in weak and
emaciated patients, "and I may observe, that two out of eight is below the usual number
of deaths after this operation. Operations for necrosis somewhat resemble several
undertaken for the removal of bullets and other extraneous bodies. Of these there have
been four in the hospital, and the patients did extremely well".
Despite the potential benefits ofanaesthesia, as described to military surgeons by Snow,
there is little evidence ofits useby British army surgeons in warinjuries before 1854. John
Shepherd, who noted that military surgeons were frequent contributors to the medical
journals ofthe time, could find only one definite report, priorto 1854, ofanaesthesiabeing
used for wounds received on the battlefield.2 This was a letter from an assistant-surgeon
2 J A Shepherd, 'The smart ofthe knife-early
anaesthesia in the services', J. R. Army Med. Corps,
1985, 131: 109-15.
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in the Indian Medical Service, who wrote following an action: "After attending my own
wounded, I proceeded to those of the enemy, and out of these 49 cases, I had 18
amputations to perform, all under the influence ofchloroform; and, with the exception of
3 cases ... every man recovered".3 Further extensive research by Shepherd did not reveal
any other references to use of anaesthesia by British army surgeons before 1854.4
Although there appears to have been little experience of military anaesthesia in the
British army, in Russia Nikolai Pirogov had used ether extensively and successfully
during the Caucasus campaign of 1847.5 He reported his results on several occasions
between 1847 and 1852, but it is perhaps unlikely that British doctors would have been
aware ofreports in Russian language publications. They would, however, have known of
the opinions of Parisian surgeons during the riots and insurrection in that city in 1848,
even if they did not read French journals, because translations of the surgeons'
experiences were reported in the Lancet. Jules Roux was said to have used chloroform
seven times in wounded patients "without the least unpleasant symptom",6 but Alfred
Velpeau thought that as "chloroform evidently depresses the nervous system, and as great
prostration always exists in patients who have received gunshot wounds, it is advisable to
refrain from any anaesthetic means".7 Dr Charles Kidd, who was in Paris at the time,
commented that "anaesthetic agents have, in almost every instance, proved highly safe
and useful", and, though he also noted that mortality after amputation was twice what it
had been in the Peninsular War, he attributed this to the facts that the Parisian hospitals
were overwhelmed by the immensely high casualty rate and that several hospitals were
themselves under siege.8 Writing after the war, Kidd claimed that further evidence for the
benefits ofchloroform in military surgery had been provided by its use during the Russian
invasion of Hungary and in the annexation of the Punjab in 1849,9 but references to
support these claims have not been found.
Immediately before the British army's embarkation, at Varna in Bulgaria, for the
Crimea, Dr John Hall, the Principal Medical Officer, issued a 'Memorandum for the
information of Medical Officers taking the field for active service'.10 It was this
memorandum which contained Hall's much quoted caution against the use ofchloroform:
Dr Hall takes this opportunity of cautioning medical officers against the use of chloroform in the
severe shock of serious gunshot wounds, as he thinks few will survive where it is used. But aspublic
opinion, founded perhaps on mistaken philanthropy, he knows is against him, he can only caution
medical officers, and entreat that they will watch its effects; for however barbarous it may appear,
the smart of the knife is a powerful stimulant; and it is much better to hear a man bawl lustily than
to see him sink silently into the grave.
3 W B McEgan, 'Chloroform in India', Lancet, during the Revolution of June', Medical Times, 1848,
1851, 2: 96. 18: 268-9, 287-9, 318-20, 369-70; ibid., 19: 23-5,
4J A Shepherd, The Crimean doctors: a history and especially, pp. 54-5.
ofthe British medical services in the Crimean War, 9 Idem, 'Safety of chloroform in gun-shot
Liverpool University Press, 1991, pp. 57-61. wounds', Med. Times Gaz., 1856, i: 340-1.
5 T Sorokina, personal communication. 10 For an original copy see the Longmore Papers,
6Lancet, 1848, ii: 316-17, p. 316. in the RAMC Muniments Collection, CMAC,
7 Alfred Velpeau, 'General considerations on Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine,
gunshot wounds; primary and secondary RAMC 1139, LP 9/11. John Hall was knighted in
amputation', Lancet, 1848, ii: 3-5, p. 5. 1856. His papers are held in the CMAC, see notes 30
8 C Kidd, 'Observations in the Paris hospitals and 33 below.
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On 23 September 1854, the Illustrated London News published in full the 'Instructions
to troops' in the invading army, which included Hall's memorandum. Some three weeks
later, after the furore caused by the inadequate arrangements for the care ofthe wounded
atthe battle ofthe Alma and theirtransport to Scutari hadalready been vented in thepress,
a fierce argument broke out in The Times concerning Hall's advice on chloroform. On 12
October, the newspaper published a letter from James Syme who wrote:
... it seems requisite to state, as a resultoflong and ample experience in opposition to what DrHall
"thinks" on the subject, thatchloroform does not increase the dangerofoperations performed during
a state of exhaustion, however extreme; that pain, instead of being a "powerful stimulant", most
injuriously exhausts the nervous energy ofa weak patient; and that, therefore, so long as the safety
ofthe operation may be in question, chloroform proves useful directly in proportion to the severity
ofthe injury or disease and the degree ofexhaustion orshock.'1
There was an immediate response when, on the next day, a letter appeared from a
correspondent who signed himself "A Military Surgeon":
Chloroform is a powerful depressant of vital action. Yesterday at University College Hospital
another victim fell sacrifice to it; and it is cheering to know that, at several ofthe London hospitals,
the perfectly safe practice ofbenumbing the part with cold, previously to its incision, is now being
substituted for chloroform in a large class ofoperations.12
Such opinions were not confined to military surgeons. In the same month Dr James Arnott
published detailed 'Instructions forusingbenumbingcoldinoperations'13 and afew months
later Thomas Wakley Junior wrote a letter to his father's journal confirming Arnott's
results.14 This letter was also noticedby the laypress,15 which suggests thatthere musthave
been public interest in safer alternatives to chloroform at this time. However, the majority
opinion in favour of chloroform was reflected in a leading article entitled 'Chloroform on
the battlefield' in the Association (subsequently British) MedicalJournal. The editor noted
that Dr Hall's opinion was "opposed to our observation on the effects ofchloroform in civil
practice", and cited, in support ofhis argument, "the statistics ofthe results ofamputations
under anaesthesia, collected by Dr Simpson a few years ago".'6 James Young Simpson's
study in fact related to amputations under ether, rather than chloroform, and was not, by
modern standards, an adequately controlled trial. It did, however, appear to show that
amputations ofthe thigh, leg and arm carried amortality of23 per centunderether, whereas
without ether the mortality was between 29 and 40 per cent.17 Some military surgeons
regarded Simpson's data as irrelevant, contending that injuries due to gunshot wounds, and
their associated shock, were fundamentally different from the operations due to illnesses
seen in civilian practice. This view, which ignored the fact that some civilian amputations
were in fact due to gunshot wounds,18 persisted even after the war.19
1 The Times, 12 Oct. 1854, p. 9, col. 1. 17 j Y Simpson, 'Does etherisation increase or
12 Ibid., 13 Oct. 1854, p. 5, col. 5. decrease the mortality attendant upon surgical
13 J Arnott, 'Instructions for using benumbing cold operations?', Monthly J. med. Sci., 1848, 8: 697-710.
in operations', Med. 7imes Gaz., 1854, ii: 488-90. 18 R Hodges, 'Amputation at the shoulder-joint
4 T Wakley, 'Anaesthesia by cold in surgical under the influence ofchloroform in a case of gun-
operations', Lancet, 1855, i: 140. shot wound', Assoc. med. J., 1854, 2: 1142-3.
15 Eddowe's Shropshire Journal, 7 Feb. 1855, p. 7. 19 J Mouat, in report ofCrimean Medical and
16 Leading article, 'Chloroform on the battlefield', Surgical Society meeting, Med. Times Gaz., 1856,
Assoc. med. J., 1854, 2: 1029-30, p. 1029. ii: 225-7.
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It is in the context ofthese differing opinions on the safety and value ofchloroform that
Hall's caution on its use must be judged. If his opinion owed more to the views of men
like Velpeau and Arnott rather than to those of Snow, Simpson and Syme, and, if that
opinion was subsequently to be proved wrong, he was certainly not alone in this.20 That
his opinion was likely to be unpopular, he himself recognized in the original
memorandum. He wrote later that he had "incurred much public odium for a well-
intentioned, but carelessly worded caution",,21 and this was echoed by Dr James Mouat,
one of his Deputy Inspector-Generals, who commented, "I am not about to enter into the
question as to whether that caution might not have been more carefully and judiciously
worded; for, no doubt, it would have been differently expressed, ifintendedforthe perusal
of a popular, instead of a professional public".22 George Macleod believed that Hall's
choice of words had been open to misinterpretation: "I have reason to know that he
himself did not mean them, as was at the time supposed, as a prohibition on its use, but
simply as a caution against its careless and indiscriminate employment".23 In August 1854
Hall was not to know that the Crimean campaign would be reported more intensively by
the lay press than any previous war, and would not have expected to find his detailed
memorandum reprinted, verbatim, in a popular magazine.
The opinion of the Principal Medical Officer, expressed in a printed memorandum,
must have influenced the practice of his subordinates, at least in the initial stages of the
war, but it is difficult tojudge the extent of this influence from the surviving evidence. R
J Mackenzie believed that "Dr Hall's order is intended to discourage the use of it
[chloroform] altogether. No one, I should think, will take any notice of it",24 and Dr
George Pyemont Smith, a civilian volunteer who arrived in Scutari in mid-November
1854, wrote that
The celebrated manifesto of Dr Hall against chloroform had not much attention paid to it at Scutari.
I had been accustomed to the use of chloroform, but certainly had never seen it given to the extent
that it was employed there. An operation was never commenced before the patient was fully under
the influence ofchloroform.25
On the other hand a Dr Tuffnell, a civilian surgeon from Dublin, felt powerless "with an
order promulgated against the use ofchloroform", and returned home.26
There is some evidence that the Medical Officers of the 2nd Division may have been
particularly influenced by Hall's memorandum. An addendum to the sixth edition of
George Guthrie's Commentaries on surgery, which was published privately at the end of
1855, stated that "Chloroform has been freely administered in all the Divisions of the
Army save the Second."27 The Principal Medical Officer of the 2nd Division was Staff
20 G H B MacLeod, 'Notes on the surgery ofthe 23 Macleod, op. cit., note 20 above, p. 992.
war', Edinb. med. J., 1856, 1: 984-1001, especially 24 Obituary, 'The late Dr R J Mackenzie',
pp. 992-3. Monthly J. med. Sci., 1854, 19: 474-8.
21 Health ofthe army in Turkey and Crimea: 25 G Pyemont Smith, 'On military medical
Paper, being medical and surgical history ofthe practice in the East', Lancet, 1855, i: 482-3, 509-10,
British armny which served in Turkey and the Crimea 582, and, especially, 647-8.
during the Russian war, Parliamentary Papers 26 Medical News, 'Amputations in the Crimea',
1857-58, vol. xxxviii, pts 1 and 2 (hereafter Medical Lancet, 1855, i: 304.
and surgical history), pt 2, p. 269. 27 Longmore Pamphlets, RAMC 423, vol. 5,
22 Report.ofCrimean Medical and Surgical Paper 1.
Society meeting, op. cit., note 19 above, p. 225.
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Surgeon Gordon, and Guthrie's addendum contained examples, supplied by Gordon, of
successful majoramputations performed without the use ofchloroform. He was oneofthe
minority of surgeons in the Crimean Medical and Surgical Society who were, at the end
of the war, still expressing considerable reservations about chloroform in major surgery,
and claimed that the Medical Officers of the Division "generally agreed with him in the
inadvisability ofemploying chloroform in serious cases".28 However, this latter statement
was subsequently challenged by Dr Burke, one ofthe Regimental Medical Officers in the
2nd Division. He was supported by Deputy Inspector-General James Williams, who said
it was "known that many cases in the 2nd Division were operated on under chloroform",
but added that "The misconception may have arisen from supposing the 2nd Division
carried out more fully than others the recommendation given at the commencement ofthe
war".29
IfHall's caution did have an influence on the use ofchloroform, it would seem that this
was probably limited to the early months ofthe war, and then only in those regiments or
divisions where the senior Medical Officers happened to concur with Hall's conservative
opinion. Such, then, was the diversity of medical opinion at the start of the war. The
following sections review the availability and use ofchloroform at different stages during
the war.
The Availability and Use ofChloroform at the Alma
and during Transport ofthe Wounded to Scutari
By mid-August 1854, 180 lbs ofchloroform hadbeen shipped to the army (Table 2). Of
this, 110 lbs had accompanied the army to Varna in Bulgaria, where 32 lbs 8 oz had been
issued to Divisions, with 77 lbs 8 oz held in store on 17 August.30 The other 70 lbs were
presumably inthehospital store atScutari. AtVarnatheLight, 2ndand 3rdDivisions were
each issued with 10 lbs of chloroform between June and 7 September, when the army
sailed for the Crimea.31 Although no records have been found, it seems probable that the
1st, 4th andCavalry Divisions wouldeach havebeen issued with the samequantity, before
embarkation, leaving 47 lbs 8 oz in store at Varna. This was further augmented by stocks
on the Medway, which had sailed with 60 lbs on board, but which called at Balaklava on
2 September where 30 lbs were transferred to the John Masterman store ship.32 The
remaining 30 lbs were presumably unloaded when she reached Vama on 4 September,
making a total of 77 lbs 8 oz in store in Varna on that date. After the army left Varna, the
hospital and purveyor's stores were transferred, not to the Crimea, but to Scutari, though
the transfer did not occur until some time after 20 October.33 Therefore, ofthe 240 lbs of
chloroform which had arrived in the East before the battle ofthe Alma on 20 September,
at least 177 lbs 8 oz were not available to surgeons afterthe battle; 70 lbs being in Scutari,
77 lbs 8 oz in store at Varna, and 30 lbs on the John Masterman store ship in Balaklava
harbour, which the army did not reach until some days after the battle. The Purveyor's
28 Report ofCrimean Medical and Surgical 32 Parliamentary report upon the state ofthe
Society meeting, Med. Times Gaz., 1856, ii: 252-4, hospitals ofthe British Army in the Crimea and
p. 252. Scutari, London, HMSO, 1855 (hereafter, Hospitals
29 Ibid., pp. 297-300, p. 300. report), pp. 57-8.
30 The Hall Papers, RAMC 397, FRS 1/la. 33 Hall Diaries transcript, RAMC 524/15/6.
31 Ibid., FRS 1/2, 1/13a, 1/15.
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Table 2
Supplies ofchloroform sent to Turkey and the Crimea 1854-1856
Vessel Date of Arrival Chloroform (lbs)
Wrights 16.5.54 40
Balbec 20.5.54 140
Medway 4.9.54 60
Army and Navy 19.1.55 100
Eagle 19.1.55 50
Whitley Park unknown 150
Black Sea 15.4.55 100
Stella 18.4.55 100
Arethusa 21.5.55 50
Eagle ? .7.55 150
Black Prince 29.8.55 208
Caroline 19.1.56 450
Peninsula 21.3.56 50
1648
Source: Medical and surgical history, see note 21 above, pt 1, p. 555.
Reserve Stores, which did accompany the army, contained 5 lbs ofchloroform, but none
ofthis had been issued before 27 September,34 and in fact only 8 oz were issued from this
store during October and a further 1 lb 8 oz during November.35
The regimental surgeons would certainly have had access to stocks of chloroform in
their field panniers, which should have contained 8 oz per regiment,36 and this quantity
was corroborated by one ofthe regimental surgeons at the battle ofthe Alma.37 As there
were 38 regiments in the Crimea at the time,38 there should have been a minimum of 19
lbs ofchloroform available to surgeons afterthebattle. How much ofthe 60 lbs whichhad
been issued to the six divisions was available is unclear. If all of it had been available,
there would havebeen a maximum of79 lbs foruse afterthe battle. There are two reasons
why there was probably much less than this. First, some of the divisional stocks were
probably used to make up the allocation of8 oz perregiment. Whetherthis was so cannot
be ascertained from the surviving records. Detailed receipts for this period are available
only forthe LightDivision, whichreceived its 10 lbs allocation on 22June andhad issued
all except 8 oz by 30 September.39 Whether these issues had been made as the initial 8 oz
allocations to eachregiment ortoreplace stocks used in the battle on 20 September cannot
be determined. Second, whatever divisional stocks remained and accompanied the army
to the Crimea should havebeen in detachment andregimental medicinechests.40 However
34 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above p. 7;
RAMC 397, FRS 5/1, see note 30 above.
35 RAMC 397, FRS 5/2 and FRS 5/3.
36 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 127.
37 Anon., 'Surgery ofthe war', Lancet, 1854, ii:
517-18.
38 RAMC 397, FRM 2/1, see note 30 above.
39 Ibid., FRS 1/2.
40 Report ofthe Commissioners appointed to
inquire into the regulations affecting the sanitary
condition ofthe army, the organisation ofmilitary
hospitals, and the treatment ofthe sick and wounded;
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most of these chests were either left behind at Varna, or re-shipped as soon as the army
landed in the Crimea because of the almost total lack of transport.41 Only the 62nd
Regiment is certainly known to have retained its chest and was "indebted to the courtesy
of the French commissariat for having brought it to the camp".42 Most of the chests
eventually reached the Crimea but were still in the Apothecary's Stores at Balaklava on 5
January 1855.43 Inventories of the contents of those belonging to the 7th, 19th and 23rd
Regiments in February 1855 made no mention ofthe chloroform which they should have
contained,44 which may imply that it had been plundered to supplement shortages during
the preceding months.
In summary, the surviving records suggest that there was a minimum of 19 lbs of
chloroform available from official supplies, and it is very unlikely that there was much
more than this, as it is improbable that any significant amount from the divisional stores
was available following the battle ofthe Alma.
Some ofthe chloroform may have been used for purposes other than anaesthesia. It was
sometimes used in the treatment of tetanus, but there were only 23 recognized cases of
tetanus duringthewholeoftheCrimeanWarandonlyafew weregivenchloroform.45 Itwas
also used by some doctors in the treatment ofdelirium tremens,46 ofwhich there were 281
cases admitted to hospital during the campaign.47 Shepherd states that it had been
recommended by inhalation for the spasms of cholera which affected huge numbers of
soldiers in Bulgaria before the army embarked for the Crimea, as well as in the Crimea
itself;48 however, there is noevidence thatchloroform was commonly usedforthispurpose.
The amount of chloroform which was used for non-anaesthetic purposes before the
battle ofthe Alma was probably quite small, and may have been counter-balanced by the
small quantities taken in the private stores of some civilian surgeons. Ifit is assumed that
there were, perhaps, 25-30 lbs available for anaesthesia, and if it is also assumed that an
average of2 oz was used for each anaesthetic,49 then there would have been sufficient for
200 to 240 anaesthetizations. If the chloroform had been readily available, where and
when it was needed, even this small proportion ofthe total which had been shipped to the
East might have been sufficient to anaesthetize those who needed major surgery after the
battle ofthe Alma, where the number ofwounded was 1722.50 Ofthese, about two-thirds
were categorized as having severe wounds, but many of the wounds were probably not
amenable to operative intervention, because, throughout the entire war, amputations,
which would have been the main indication for anaesthesia, did not amount to more than
5 per cent of all the wounded.51 However, the distribution of chloroform did not
correspond, either at divisional or regimental levels, with where it was needed. For
example, three of the six divisions suffered 98 per cent of the casualties (Table 3). At a
with evidence andappendix, London, HMSO, 1858, above, pt 2, pp. 279-85.
Appendix 79, (hereafter Sanitary report), p. 137, 46 Report ofCrimean Medical Society meeting,
Correspondence No. 602, letter 5 from D Dumbreck Med. limes Gaz., 1856, ii: 376-8, p. 378.
to T Alexander. 47 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21
41 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above, above, pt 2, Table A, unpaginated, following p. 251.
Regimental Surgeons' reports, pp. 68-153. 48 Shepherd, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 132.
42 Ibid., p 136. 49 Ibid., p. 132.
43 RAMC 397, FRS 1/18, see note 30 above. 50 RAMC 397, FRM 2/1, see note 30 above.
44 Ibid., FCO 32/16b, 21c, 21d. 5 Ibid., FRM 1/1-7 and FRM 7/10.
45 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21
168The Use ofChloroform during the Crimean War
Table 3
The casualty rates in different divisions at the Battle ofthe Alma
Division Killed Wounded Missing
Calvalry 0 0 0
First 46 551 1
Second 86 409 3
Third 1 38 3
Fourth 1 3 0
Light 207 771 11
Source: RAMC 397 FRM 2/1, see note 30 above.
regimental level each regiment had, in theory, 8 oz of chloroform, but in the Light
Division the distribution among the regiments was very uneven, and bore no relationship
to the casualty rates in the different regiments (Table 4). The 7th Fusiliers, which had one
of the highest casualty rates, apparently had no chloroform, whereas the 88th Regiment,
which suffered only light casualties, had received 2 lbs 8 oz by 30 September. It is, of
course, possible that the 7th Fusiliers had obtained supplies from other sources; for
example, the 33rd Regiment received an additional 2 lbs from an unspecified source at
some time between October 1854 and January 1855,52 and between 1 September and 31
December 1854 a number of regiments received supplies directly from the Dispenser in
charge in the Crimea53 instead ofvia the usual distribution from divisional stores, most of
The Light Division-Stocks
Table 4
of chloroform and casualties at the Battle of the Alma
Regiment/Detachment Issues ofChloroform Killed Wounded
22.6.54-30.9.54
lbs ozs
Artillery 8 12 20
Sappers and Miners - - I
7th Fusiliers - 41 179
19th Regiment 8 41 179
23rd Fusiliers 8 51 157
33rd Regiment 1 8 56 183
77th Regiment 1 0 3 17
88th Regiment 2 8 4 17
2nd Battalion Rifles 2 8 11 39
Other Corps
General Hospital Staff 8
Remaining in Divisional Store 8
Source: RAMC 397 FRS 1/2, FRM 2/1 see note 30 above.
52 Ibid., FRS 1/3b.
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which had probably been left in Vama or on the ships which transported the army to the
Crimea. However, it is likely thatissues fromtheDispenser were madeonly afterthearmy
reached Balaklava, six days after the battle ofthe Alma, when the Dispenser would have
had access to his stores.
It is also known that some surgeons took their own supplies ofchloroform with them.
One of these was Dr R J Mackenzie, a civilian volunteer attached to the 79th Regiment.
How much chloroform he had is not known, but he probably carried very little because
"we are all to carry our kits. I weighed mine yesterday, and between knapsack, haversack,
rations, etc, I shall have within a few ounces of 50 lbs on my back!" Mackenzie died of
cholera shortly after the battle of the Alma and his obituary recorded that "in addition to
extracting numerous balls, and dressing a multitude of wounds, he performed 27 capital
operations".54 It seems improbable that his own private supply ofchloroform would have
been adequate for this workload. Like other surgeons he was probably "borrowing from
another's small pannier stock when he could ill spare the loan. There was no general
canteen for general purposes".55
The official medical history ofthe war stated that "On the field atAlma, it [chloroform]
was largely employed".56 However, the information on the availability of chloroform at
regimental level tends to corroborate the opinion of a surgeon on the battlefield that "the
supply ofchloroform was most limited",57 and W G Watt, the surgeon to the 23rd Royal
Welch Fusiliers, which had suffered 51 killed and 157 wounded, reported that "After the
battle of Alma . . . I was also unable to procure a proper supply of chloroform, the
divisional supply having been exhausted, and I could not procure it from the general
hospital".58
Following the battle, the majority of the wounded were transferred by boat from
Balaklava to the hospitals in Scutari. Ofthe eleven transport ships used at this time, only
five had been issued with chloroform by the Dispenser in charge at Balaklava (Table 5).
TheAndes received no chloroform at Balaklava, but had been equipped as a hospital ship
at Vama in August 1854, when 2 lbs ofchloroform were supplied.59 However, according
to Shepherd, when the Andes reached the Crimea the master denied that there were any
medical stores onboard,60 though DrJohnTice, who was her senior surgeon when she left
Balaklava on 22 September, reported that he "found everything requisite in the shape of
medicine, comforts, instruments, appliances", and he describedthe supply ofmedicines as
"ample", the supply of surgical instruments as "'sufficient for every purpose", and the
supply of materials and appliances as "abundant"..61 Victor Bonham-Carter quotes,
without giving the archive reference, from the papers of John Hall, who painted a very
different picture.
The Andes and Cambria were told off by Admiral Boxer as Hospital Ships and were equipped at
Vama forthatpurpose in August 1854 ... They were ill calculated forthe service they were intended
for, and the Captain of the Andes was a drunken ill-conditioned man and subsequently occasioned
much embarrassment by trans-shipping the stores to another vessel-without giving notice or
54 Obituary, op. cit., note 24 above. 58 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above,
55 'Surgery ofthe war', op. cit., note 37 above. p. 155.
56 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 59 Ibid., p. 250.
above, pt 2, p. 266. 60 Shepherd, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 139.
57 Anon., 'Treatment ofthe wounded in the 61 Hospitals Report, op. cit., note 32 above,
Crimea', Med. Times Gaz., 1854, ii: 506-8, 507. pp. 196-7.
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Table S
Transport ships carrying sick and wounded from the Crimea between 22 and 30 September 1854
Vessel Date sailed Chloroform Sick and wounded Deaths on board
on board Source (1) Source (2) Source (2)
Vulcan 22 Sept. (1)(2)
Andes 22 Sept. (2)
23 Sept. (1)
Arthur the 22 Sept. (2)
Great 23 Sept. (1)
None (4) 455, ofwhich
wounded:
?435(1) ?300(5)
None (4) 420430
wounded
2-Olbs(3)(4) 384 wounds and
cholera
Orient 22 Sept. (2)
23 Sept. (1)
None (4) 274 ofwhich
203 wounded
190 British 33
Colombo 22 Sept. (2) 2-Olbs(3)(4) No data
Caduceus 24 Sept. (2) None (4) 430, no wounded
Courier 25 Sept. (2) None (4) 291, all sick
except one
wounded Russian
480 (2)
553 - at least
442 wounded(5)
318
265
+ prisoners
Timandra 29 Sept. (1)
30 Sept. (2)
None (4) No data
Medway No data 0-3 oz (3) No data
Himalaya No data 0-4oz (3) No data
Golden
Fleece
No data 0-4oz (3) No data
305
No data
No data
No data
Sources: (1) Hospitals report, see note 32 above, pp. 193-202.
(2) Medical and surgical history, see note 21 above, pt 2, p. 465.
(3) RAMC 397 FRS 6/3, see note 30 above.
(4) Ibid., FRT 1/1.
(5) The Times, 13 Oct. 1855, p. 8, col. 3.
171
434 19
335 19
322 45
30
(2)(5)
111
33
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anyone knowing where they [were]. In December they were accidentally discovered in the Store in
the Light Division, the packages all broken open and the things plundered.62
Another reference in Hall's papers gives a slightly different version:
... and the captain oftheAndes, feeling indignant at ... having his ship converted into a hospital
ship, stowed away the stores thathad been put on board atVarna, in the hold ofhis vessel; and when
the ship was required to take the wounded down to Scutari after the battle ofthe Alma, he declared
to the Admiral, that no stores of the kind were on board his ship, and there was no-one present to
contradict him, as the Medical Officer had been taken out of the vessel and put on board the
Kangaroo and Dunbar at Toulza Bay. Some months afterwards the cases containing these stores
were found in a Regimental Baggage warehouse in Balaklava, broken open, and what remained of
their contents was handed over to the Apothecary and Purveyor there.63
All the 430 officers and soldiers on board theAndes were wounded rather than sick from
illnesses, the majority had severe gunshot wounds, and had undergone amputation of the
lower limb. Whether those who needed operation during the voyage were given
chloroform must remain uncertain but it seems improbable. Neither the Courier nor
the Caduceus was issued with chloroform at Balaklava, but all the soldiers on these two
ships, except for a Russian prisoner who had had a foot amputated, were sick rather than
wounded.64 The Vulcan was another of the transports to which chloroform was not
supplied. Her surgeon, James Peters, reported that when he went abroad there were "no
medicines, none were sent; but on making a demand, I received such as were needed".65
Whether the medicines contained a supply of chloroform is not documented, but one of
the surgeons who came to assist the over-stretched Peters "had to operate several times
without chloroform, amputate thighs, his orderly or servant alone assisting him".66 The
Arthur the Great had been supplied with 2 lbs ofchloroform, and her senior surgeon, Dr
Arthur Anderson, described the supply of medicines as "sufficient", and the supply of
surgical instruments, materials and appliances as "ample".67 However, another surgeon
reported that "No medicines were on board but those in the ship's chest, and the captain
naturally looked with a jealous eye on these being taken, because he saw the number
around to consume, and his natural feelings led him to think of his own crew and their
probable future necessities".68 The evidence of Archibald McNicol, a private in the 55th
Regiment who was wounded at the Alma, indicates that there was some chloroform on
board but either the supply was insufficient or the surgeons did not always choose to use
it: "There were agood many operations onboard. They usedchloroform in somecases".69
The Colombo was also issued with 2 lbs ofchloroform at Balaklava. According to the
evidence ofCorporal Andrew Buchanan ofthe 19th Regiment, who was on board from 22
to 26 September, there were at least thirty amputations during the voyage: "I came down
in the Colombo from Alma ... there must have been, I should say, five or six amputations
62 V Bonham-Carter, Surgeon in the Crimea: the 66 'Surgery ofwar', op. cit., note 37 above.
experiences ofGeorge Lawson recorded in letters he 67 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above,
sent to hisfamily 1854-55, London, Constable, 1968, p. 197.
p. 190. 68 'Treatment ofthe wounded', op. cit., note 57
63 RAMC 397, FRT 2, see note 30 above. above, p. 508.
64 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above, 69 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above,
pp. 200 and 202. p. 323. 65 Ibid., p. 196.
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each day onboard".70The medical evidence suggests thatthere may havebeen even more.
The surgeon ofHMSNiger, who was seconded to the Colombo wrote:
Fancy about 650 wounded officers and men, including the Russians, on board our ship, and only
three doctors to attend them, myself and two others! I assure you we were working day and night,
not even time to sit down to dinner. Nothing but cutting off arms and legs all day long. I had more
operations during that time than any London surgeon in a twelvemonth. We could not operate fast
enough to save all the wounded on board. I had one amputation of the shoulder-joint, and as for
thighs and legs, I left offcounting them.71
A secondhand report added, "I have it from the lips of a senior officer on board the
Colombo, with whom I am upon most intimate terms, that they alone had 600 wounded
on board, and during the whole passage . . . that the three surgeons never ceased their
amputations, assisted by volunteers from the crew ofthe ship; that the decks were running
with blood the whole time worse than shambles, and the exhalations were overpowering
in the extreme".72 Two pounds of chloroform can scarcely have been sufficient for the
number of operations during the voyage. Hall, commenting on the provision of the
transport ships, wrote that "All these ships had to be separately fitted up for sick and
wounded from our necessarily limitted [sic] stores at Balaklava . . .".73
Availability and Use ofChloroform at
Balaklava and Inkerman
Calculation of the availability of chloroform at regimental level at the battles of
Balaklava and Inkerman is uncertain because there is little or no information about
regimental stocks at these times. Those regiments which were heavily involved at the
Almahad almostcertainly exhausted their supplies following thatbattle. Medical Officers
from regiments which were not involved went to the assistance ofthose who were,74 and
musttherefore have used some oftheirregimental supplies as well. W G Watt, the surgeon
to the 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers, was unable to obtain chloroform from either the
divisional store (Light Division) or from the General Hospital at Balaklava after the battle
oftheAlma,75 which would imply that these sources had not been able to obtain any from
the Dispenser's stores in Balaklava. The Dispenser's stocks must have been low on 2
October because on that date the Light Division put in a requisition for 8 lbs, but received
only 4 lbs three days later.76 Subsequent requisitions from the Light Division on 19
October, 8 and 22 November, and 9 and 13 December did not mention chloroform, so
presumably the Division eventually obtained supplies.77
On 15 October Mr J E Kersey, the Dispenser of Medicines in charge at Balaklava, put
in a request to Scutari for40 lbs ofchloroform, but received only 15 lbs and that not until
29 October,78 which was four days after the battle ofBalaklava. The implication must be
that stocks ofchloroform in the Crimea were low at the time ofthat battle. Whether they
70 Ibid., p. 312. 74 Shepherd, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 126-30.
71 Anon., 'The war', Lancet, 1854, ii: 388-9, 75 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above,
p. 389. p. 155.
72 Anon., 'Treatment of the wounded', Lancet, 76 Ibid., p. 182.
1854, ii: 495. 77 Ibid., p. 183-4.
73 RAMC 397, FRT 2, see note 30 above. 78 Ibid., p. 191.
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had been replenished before the battle of Inkerman cannot be determined from the
surviving records. Certainly Kersey did not include chloroform among his requirements
in his requisition in November,79 and nor did his deputy, Mr F Fernandez, mention it in
his list ofitems "required most urgently for the use ofLord Raglan's army in the Crimea"
on 16 December 1854.80 The Field Hospital of the 20th Regiment was able to obtain in
full asmall requisition for4 ozofchloroform on 1 December 1854,81 butwhetherthis was
obtained from the Divisional Store or from Dispenser Kersey in Balaklava is not stated.
No fresh supplies of chloroform arrived in Turkey or the Crimea between 4 September
1854 and 19 January 1855, but Fernandez recorded that 16 lbs was "on hand in store" at
Balaklava on 1 January 1855.82 It is possible that the balance of the October requisition
had arrived following the interim supply of 15 lbs which Kersey received on 29 October,
and that is why neither Kersey or Fernandez made any mention of chloroform in their
requisitions in November or December. It is also possible that they were not always fully
aware of the total amount of chloroform in their possession during October, November
and the first halfofDecember. As Kersey explained to the Commissioners who were sent
to investigate the state ofthe hospitals in the Crimea and Scutari:
I had my supplies at first on board the John Masterman [a store ship in Balaklava harbour]. They
were not landed until December 18th. I had great difficulty in finding what I wanted. I had
constantly to dive down into the hold of the ship; and as the crew occasionally shifted my cases, I
had great difficulty in putting my hand on them ... The Purveyor had his stores on board the John
Masterman as well as me, and our stores got intermixed and great confusion arose. I have had great
delay in getting things landed. I also had great difficulty in complying with requisitions as long as
the stores remained on board the John Masterman, as I had to go on board on all occasions, and I
could not always obtain a boat.83
His deputy, Mr Fernandez, gave a similar description of their difficulties.84 Their
problems must have been aggravated when the John Masterman was badly damaged in
the great storm on 14 November 1854. 85
There are only a few surviving documents and reports which mention the availability
and use of chloroform following the battles of Balaklava and Inkerman. The official
medical history ofthe warclaimed that "On the field at Alma, it [chloroform] was largely
employed, and still more generally at Balaklava and Inkermann ...,.86 However, this
report has to be treated with some caution as the authors were anxious to rebut the
criticisms which had been made as a result ofHall's caution against the use ofchloroform
in gunshot wounds. A report from an anonymous, probably regimental, surgeon, written
after the battle of Inkerman stated that "we had plenty of water, brandy, opium, beef-tea
and chloroform, hay, blankets, etc., ... Chloroform was generally used-in this regiment
in every serious operation".87 The samejournal published another letter which said "we
had lots of water, brandy, opium, blankets, hay, chloroform . . .",88 which may have been
79 Ibid., p. 190. 85 Hall Diaries transcript, RAMC 524/15/6.
80 Ibid., p. 191. 86 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., see note
81 Ibid., p. 106. 21 above, pt 2, p. 266.
82 RAMC 397, FRS 2/1 and FBS 1/5, see note 30 87 Anon., 'Use ofchloroform at Inkermann',
above. Med. Times Gaz., 1854, ii: 671.
83 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above, 88 Anon., 'Medical life in camp', Med. limes
p. 334. Gaz., 1855, i: 47-8, 48.
84 Ibid., pp. 336-7.
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written by the same surgeon as the author stated that he had written a previous letter, and
the items mentioned as being plentiful are so similar. Shepherd suggests that the author
was Assistant-Surgeon John Wyatt of the Coldstream Guards who also noted in his
regimental report that "Chloroform, with two exceptions, was employed in every case".89
However, E M Wrench, who arrived in the Crimea a few days after the great storm of 14
November 1854, commented that
The older surgeons had a great dread of (the then recently invented) chloroform, fostered by the
historical memorandum from the Director-General almost forbidding its use ... We therefore only
used chloroform forthe more serious operations, and neverto facilitate examination, orforwhat we
consider trivial operations, as cutting out bullets or setting compound fractures.90
After the battles of Balaklava and Inkerman the more seriously injured were again
transferred tofScutari. In comparison with the critical reports of the transfer of those
wounded at the Alma, there appears to have been' relatively little complaint about
conditions on the transport ships after these later battles. Information about supplies of
chloroform on the transports at this time is shown in Table 6. The Talavera and theAndes
carried, between them, about 400 wounded but no chloroform. Assuming an amputation
rate of5 per cent among the wounded and 2 oz ofchloroform for each anaesthetic,91 then
the supplies ofchloroform on the remaining ships were probably adequate, especially as
it is likely that some ofthe wounded had had their operations before embarking.
Hall and his staffwere still experiencing difficulties in equipping the transport ships in
December 1854 and January 1855. In a letter to the Quartermaster General written on 18
January 1855,92 in response to acomplaint about a lack ofmedical supplies on theJoseph
Sheppard, which had sailed from Balaklava on 12 December,93 Hall wrote: "So long as
numerous transports have to be fitted up at afew hours notice forthereception ofthe sick,
from limited stores, articles will occasionally run short, or be altogether wanting, but
every effort is made to obviate this as much as possible". In the circumstances, it is
probably not surprising that some ships sailed with no chloroform on board.
The supplies of chloroform listed in Tables 5 and 6 for ships sailing between 22-30
September, and 26 October and 11 November, afterthe majorbattles, total 7 lbs 5 oz. This
accords reasonably well with the total of 11 lbs 1 oz which Dispenser Kersey issued tothe
"hospital ships" from the store in Balaklava from the end of October to 31 December
1854.94
The Availability and Use ofChloroform in the
Hospitals at Scutari
By mid-August 1854, 180 lbs of chloroform had been shipped to Turkey and Bulgaria,
and it is known that 110 lbs were at Varna on 17 August.95 There was a small hospital at
89 Shepherd, op. cit., note 4 above., pp. 234-6, 92 Public Record Office, WO 28/176.
p. 234. 93 Hospitals Report, op. cit., note 32 above,
90 E M Wrench, 'The lessons ofthe Crimean p. 237.
war', Br med. J., 1899, ii: 205-8, p. 207. 94 RAMC 397, FBS 1/5, see note 30 above.
91 RAMC 397, FRM 1/1-7 and FRM 7/10, see 95 Ibid., FRS 1/la.
note 30 above; Shepherd, op. cit., note 4 above,
p. 132.
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Table 6
Transport ships carrying sick and wounded from the Crimea between
26 October and 11 November 1854
Vessel Date sailed Chloroform Sick and wounded Deaths on board
on board Source (1) Source (2) Source (2)
Echunga 26 Oct. (1)(2) 0-8oz (3)
Shooting 26 Oct. (1)(2) 0-2oz (3)
Star
Palmerston 27 Oct. (2)
141 all wounded
mainly disease
0-8oz (3) 300 mainly sick
Australian 27 Oct. (1)(2) 0-8oz (1)(3)
plus 0-8oz
ether (1)
203 wounded 150 + Russians
Tynemouth 31 Oct. (1)(2) 0-8oz (3) 73 British wounded
80 Russians - many
wounded
Talavera 6 Nov. (2) None (3) 178 wounded
7 Nov. (1)
174
169
Colombo 7 Nov. (2)
9 Nov (1)
2-Olbs (3) 293 wounded
Sydney 7 Nov. (1)(2) 0-8oz (3) 230 all wounded
except one
281
231
Arabia 7 Nov. (1)(2) None (3)
0-8oz (1)
273 wounds and
dysentery
Mauritius 8 Nov. (1) 0-8oz (3) 179 wounded
64 sick
Andes 11 Nov. (1)(2) None (3) 239 wounded
176
133 7
177 24
305 11
8
10
10
4
2
25 4
23 12
215
Sources: (1) Hospitals report, see note 32 above, pp. 206-20.
(2) Medical and surgical history, see note 21 above, pt 2, p. 466.
(3) RAMC 397 FRT 1/1, see note 30 above.
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Gallipoli which had 8 oz in store on 1 September96 and which did not receive any further
supplies in the next three months.97 In late August the only other British military base was
at Scutari, so it is probable that the remaining 69 lbs 8 oz ofchloroform were in store at the
General Hospital there. TheMedway, carrying 60lbsofchloroform, transferred 30lbs tothe
John Masterman store ship in Balaklava harbour on 2 September,98 and arrived in Varna on
4 September. The remaining 30 lbs was then probably transferred, with the other hospital
stores at Varna, to Scutari but not until after 20 October.99 At the time of the battle of the
Alma the stock ofchloroform at Scutari was therefore probably 69 lbs 8 oz. As previously
discussed, at least 19 lbs and possibly as much as 44 lbs was subsequently shipped to the
Crimea to meet the requisitions ofthe Dispenser in Balaklava during October to December
1854, leaving a minimum of25 lbs 8 oz available at Scutari until further supplies arrived on
19 January 1855. At arate of2 oz foreachanaestheticl°this would havebeen sufficient for
about 200 operations, which should have been more than adequate for the requirements in
Scutari at that time. All amputations at Scutari would have been delayed, secondary,
operations. During theperiod from 26 Septemberto 27 November, which coveredthe major
battles of Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman and the first bombardment of Sebastopol, there
were eithersixty1o1 orsixty-fivel02 secondary amputations. The few reports which describe
the use ofchloroform at Scutari confirm that supplies were adequate. The Reverend Sydney
Osborne was appointed Almoner to The Times Fund and arrived in Constantinople on 8
November, three days after the battle of Inkerman. He went on to Scutari almost
immediately and stayed for four or five weeks. During his time there "chloroform was
always used .. ..", even though "there was not a single operating table".103 George Pyemont
Smith, who arrived at Scutari on about 17 November and stayed until at least 18 February,
commented that "an operation was never commenced before the patient was fully underthe
influence of chloroform".104 The evidence of Osborne and Pyemont Smith shows that
supplies of chloroform were adequate between early November 1854 and mid-February
1855. In factby early February the supplies were more than adequate, amounting to 186 lbs
8 oz; ofwhich 82 lbs were in the General Hospital store, 4 lbs 8 oz in the Barrack Hospital
store, and a further 100 lbs were as yet unpacked.105 The unpacked stocks had probably
come with the Army and Navy and the Eagle, both of which arrived in the East on 19
January, the former carrying 100 lbs and the latter 50 lbs.
The Availability and Use ofChloroform from
January 1855 until the End ofthe War
The severity ofthe Crimean winter limited the potential for military activity during the
first three months of 1855 and, although the troops suffered severely from the effects of
poor sanitation, disease and malnutrition, there were only 39 amputations among patients
admitted to the army hospitals during this quarter (Table 7). Nearly 60 per cent of these
96 Hospitals Report, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 298. 102 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21
97 Ibid., p. 289. above, pt 2, p. 373.
98 Ibid., p. 58. 103 S G Osborne, Scutari and its hospitals,
99 Hall Diaries transcript, RAMC 524/15/6. London, Dickinson Bros., 1855, pp. 19-20.
1h dPyemont Smith, op. cit., note 25 above, p. 648.
Shepherd, op., cit., note 4 above, p. 132. 105 Hospitals Report, op. cit., see note 32 above,
101 RAMC 397, FRM 2/8, see note 30 above. p. 350.
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Table 7
Numbers and amputations, and the percentages in which chloroform was used,
from 19 September 1854 to 31 December 1855
Date All amputations Excluding fingers and toes
% in which % in which
Total chloroform used Total chloroformused
19 Sept. to 31 Dec. 1854 222 60 160 66
1 Jan. to 31 March 1855 39 95 16 100
1 April to 30 June 1855 337 72 203 89
1 July to 30 Sept. 1855 637 60 402 75
1 Oct. to 31 Dec. 1855 118 64 94 66
Source: Quarterly returns ofwounds and injuries received in action admitted into the hospitals of
the army in the East, RAMC 397 FRM 1/1 to 1/6, see note 30 above.
operations were on fingers and toes, probably as aconsequence offrost-bite. Although the
majority of amputations at this time were minor ones, chloroform was used in all except
two cases, whereas it had been used in only 60 per cent ofcases in the first few months of
the war. The increased use ofchloroform may have been a consequence ofthe relatively
small number ofcases requiring amputation. The requirement for supplies ofchloroform
would have been proportionately lowerthan ithadbeen following the majorbattles ofthe
Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman, and the first bombardment ofSebastopol. Moreover, the
surgeons would not have been overwhelmed by large numbers of patients who required
urgent surgery. The Association Medical Journal had been critical of Hall's "caution"
against the use ofchloroform, but recognized that
Chloroform when applied properly causes a delay of three or four minutes before the
commencement of the operation, and it requires one extra hand during the whole time of its
performance. To put apatientonly partially underthe influence ofchloroform is worse than useless,
as it renders the operation more difficult for the surgeon; and to have the patient recovering before
the end ofthe operation is equally embarrassing. On these accounts an extra person is required for
its management, and this person could probably notbe spared during a great battle. Butgreat battles
only occur now and then, and warfare is chiefly made up ofpetty skinmishes and prolonged sieges,
for the constantly recurring casualties of which there is usually a sufficient staff of surgeons in
attendance. 0
The difficulties ofusing chloroform in the field at the time ofa greatbattle were described
by an artillery surgeon who was present at Inkerman:
106 'Chloroform on the battlefield', op. cit., note
16 above, p. 1029.
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I hear there is a great cry against our not using chloroform; but, the more I see, the more strongly
am I convinced that it is not of much value in the field; it reduces the number of medical men
available for duty. It would be simply murder to leave the administration to any but educated hands,
and seldom can you get more than onedoctorto assist atanoperation; forinstance, I hadto amputate
a leg and an arm, with only my own servant as an assistant; and how many others have had to
operate under even more unfavourable circumstances, I cannot say, but they were many....
Operating in the field and in a well-found Hospital are vastly different affairs.107
The relatively small number of patients requiring amputations between January and
March 1855 would have placed little strain on the surgeons and there would have been
spare hands available to give the anaesthetic. Supplies of chloroform were clearly
adequate to meet the small demand. It is also possible that the outcry at home encouraged
the surgeons to use chloroform more readily.
After the bombardment of Sebastopol was restarted on 9 April 1855 the casualty rate
increased substantially, and there were 337 amputations during April, May and June.
Chloroform was used in only 72 per cent of these operations. Further supplies arrived
during these months but it is possible that, once again, the chloroform was not always
available when and where it was needed. On 5 February there were 186 lbs 8 oz at
Scutarit08 and very little ofthis can have been used during February and March. However,
on 13 April Dr Andrew Smith, the Director General of the Army Medical Service in
London, wrote to Hall in the Crimea to express his concern about the total lack ofquinine
and the small stocks ofchloroform available at Balaklava on 5 March:
I earnestly request you will take care to prevent your stock of medicines getting so low as it
appears to have been on the 5th ultimo, as under the present circumstances of the troops a much
larger supply ought always to be available for issue, and I cannot believe it possible that any
difflculty can exist in maintaining such a supply, as the quantities ofevery article at Scutari must be
very large.
The total want ofquinine and the small amount ofchloroform which you return in store especially
attracted my attention, and care must be taken to avoid the necessity of having to make such
confessions in future. You may rest assured the public will not lose this opportunity of holding up
the department to furtherobloquy; buteven were there no reason to fearthat, it must be keptin mind
that nothing but the absolute inability ofsecuring the articles could warrant such a want ofthem.109
By the end ofMarch 1855 the stocks ofchloroform at Balaklava amounted to 41 lbs 6
oz and on 27 April Smith wrote again to Hall to express his
... great satisfaction ... that the medical supplies are now abundant, and I trust that there will never
again be any deficiency, either in regimental hospitals or the divisional, or in the central store
attached to the army, but that an arrangement shall be made, and strictly carried out, whereby
medical stores far in advance of any possible demand shall be forwarded on your requisition from
the medical depot at Scutari, at which station a superabundance will always be found.110
Smith must have hoped that the adverse publicity resulting from a lack of medical
supplies would now be a thing ofthe past, but barely more than two weeks later he had to
deal with a complaint that there was now a "total lack ofquinine in the camp hospitals in
107 Anon., 'Medical life in camp', Med. Times 109 Sanitary report, op. cit., note 40 above, p. 47,
Gaz., 1854, ii: 603-4, p. 604. Letter No. 160.
108 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above, 110 Ibid., p. 51, Letter No. 183.
p. 350.
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the East"."'1 In this letter Smith also commented on the work of Mr Fernandez who was
by then the ChiefApothecary in charge ofthe medical stores at Balaklava:
I observe you mention that Mr Apothecary Fernandez has occasionally permitted the quantity of
certain articles inthe medical store underhis charge togetlow, without making you acquainted with
the circumstance. You mustadministerhim awarning againstsuch apractice and orderhimto report
to you in writing, at least twice a week, to the condition ofthe medical depot as to the quantity and
quality ofthe stores in his charge.
Should Mr Fernandez again prove inattentive, you will not hesitate at once to prefer charges
against him for neglect ofduty, and will take care to press the utmost rigour ofmartial law against
him ...
One has to feel sympathy for poor Fernandez because, at about the same time that he
would have received his severe warning for allowing the stocks to run too low, Hall
received another letter from Dr Alexander Cumming, the Principal Medical Officer at
Scutari, complaining that "MrFernandez makes enormous demands . . .s",112 and again, on
12 June, "Dr [sic] Fernandez requisitions astonished Mr Joseph and really they are
enormous",.113 Even so, the stocks ofchloroform in the store at Balaklava had fallen to 18
lbs 8 oz by 30 June as Fernandez was regularly issuing more than he was receiving from
Scutari.114 The complaint about the lack ofquinine, which had led to this latest round of
correspondence, was investigated. At the time at which the complaint was made there
were indeed no stocks in the Balaklava store. There were, however, 28 lbs to be found
among the Regimental Hospitals but the distribution was uneven and some regiments and
divisions had no quinine at all.115 It is possible that shortages of chloroform may have
arisen as a result ofsimilar inequalities in distribution. The shortage ofquinine may have
resulted from the practice, started in the 1st Division, ofissuing quinine prophylactically
for the prevention offever."16 Smith approved of this and sent further large supplies to
meet the increased demand.117
During July, August and September deliveries ofchloroform to the stores in Balaklava
amounted to 500 lbs.118 How much of this had been received before the assault on the
Redan on 8 September 1855, when the British suffered very heavy casualties, cannot be
determined from the surviving records. A large shipment of208 lbs ofchloroform arrived
in the East on 29 August, just nine days before the storming of the Redan. Ifit had been
unloaded in Balaklava it would havebeen available in timeforthebattle, butifithadbeen
shipped to Scutari it might not have been transferred to Balaklava in time. Two pieces of
evidence suggest that it was unloaded in Scutari. All supplies were supposed to be
delivered to Scutari; stocks were then sent to Balaklava as and when requisitions from
there were received. However, Smith in London had been sending some medical supplies
directly to Balaklava "in consequence of Dr Hall having repeatedly complained of the
difficulties he has experienced in obtaining supplies from Scutari . . .", and on 2 July 1855
111 Ibid., p. 54, Letter No. 196. 113 Ibid., p. 195.
112 J W Warburton, 'A medical history ofthe 114 RAMC 397, FRS 2/2, see note 30 above.
British expeditionary force in the east 1854-1856', 115 Sanitary report, op. cit., note 40 above, pp. 55,
PhD thesis, University of Keele, 1982, Appendix I, 62, Letters Nos. 200, 232, 234.
'Transcript ofletters written by Inspector General 116 Ibid., p. 63, Letter No. 235.
Cumming, PMO Scutari, to Inspector General Hall, 117 Ibid., p. 55, Letter No. 200.
PMO to the Expeditionary Force', p. 192. 118 RAMC 397, FRS 2/3, see note 30 above.
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Smith had had to explain his unauthorized actions to the Deputy Secretary at War.119 In
the light of this experience, he would probably have reverted to sending supplies in the
authorized manner to Scutari. The fact that the Balaklava stores issued only 46 lbs 7 ozs
ofchloroform during July, August and September'20 also suggests that the majority ofthe
500lbs received during this time did not arrive until afterthe majoraction on 9 September.
No reports ofshortages ofchloroform have survived fromthis period, but anaesthesia was
used in only 60 per cent ofthe 637 amputations which took place between 1 July and 30
September. How far this was the result ofshortages, or oflack ofspare personnel to give
anaesthetics, or ofmedical practice and opinion, cannot be determined.
After the Russians evacuated Sebastopol in early September minor skirmishes
continued, and there were 118 amputations during the final quarter of 1855. There can
have been no shortages ofchloroform at this time, either in the Crimea or in Scutari. The
stores in Balaklava had 472 lbs in stock on 1 October, and during the next three months
only 59 lbs wereissued.121 AtScutari there were 699 lbs 8 oz in stock on 1 March 1856.122
The only supply to reach the East between 1 October 1855 and 1 March 1856 was a
shipment of 450 lbs which arrived on 19 January. There must therefore have been in
excess of250 lbs available at Scutari on 1 October 1855. Despite this abundance, and the
relatively small numberofamputations during the lastquarterofthe year, only 64 percent
of patients were given anaesthetics. Only one conclusion is possible. At the end of the
Crimean War surgeons were choosing to use chloroform in only two-thirds of patients
who required amputation. This proportion is identical to that at the beginning of the war
when chloroform was undoubtedly in short supply and when some surgeons were
particularly likely to have been influenced by Hall's "caution".
The Validity ofthe Data in Table 7
The discussion and conclusions in the previous sections depend heavily on the validity
ofthe data inTable 7, which is derived from statistical returns in theprivate papers ofJohn
Hall. The information on amputations in these statistical returns differs from that given
elsewhere in the Hall papers (Table 8), and from that given in the official medical history
ofthe war,123 in several respects. First, the data given in the official history are limited to
the period from 1 April 1855 to "the end of the war", apparently on the grounds that
reliable information on the numbers of amputations before April 1855 was not available.
Even when allowance is made for this (source 2 in Table 8) there is a considerable
discrepancy. All sources in the Hall papers give numbers ofamputations which are greater
than those in the official history. It could be that some ofthe returns in the Hall papers are
an overestimate, perhaps as a result of counting the same patients twice if they were
initially admitted to a Field or Regimental Hospital and then transferred to a General
Hospital. However, the data for Field Hospitals alone in the Hall papers (sources 5 and 6
in Table 8) give numbers which are higher than those in the official history, and it is
improbable thatthere is duplicate counting in thesefigures because aField Hospital would
119 Sanitary report, op. cit., note 40 above, Letter 122 Ibid., FRS 2/6.
No. 259. 123 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21
120 RAMC 397, FRS 2/3, see note 30 above. above, pt 2, pp. 368-79.
121 Ibid., FRS 2/4.
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Table 8
Information on numbers ofamputations during the Crimean War
Source Site ofoperation Period covered Number of
amputations
1. RAMC 397 FRM 1/1-1/6
2. Ibid.
3. RAMC 397 FRT 2
"Admitted into hospitals"
ditto
Entire war
1 April 1855 to
31 Dec. 1855
Field Hospitals and Scutari ? Entire war
4. RAMC 397 MI/17
5. RAMC 397 FRM lnb
6. RAMC 397 FRT 2
Field Hospitals
Field Hospitals
7. RAMC 397 FRM 2/8 Hospitals "General and
Supplementary"
26 Sept. 1854 to
27 Nov. 1854
8. Med. surg. hist.,
pp. 363-79
9. Med. surg. hist., p. 339
10. None found
All cases 1 April 1855 to
end of war
All cases ditto
Transport ships
Sources: RAMC 397, see note 30 above. Medical and surgical history, see note 21 above.
only note the initial hospital admission. The various numbers given in sources from the
Hall papers are probably consistent with one another. If there were approximately 950
amputations in Field Hospitals, then a total of 1134 in all hospitals (sources 3 and 4 in
Table 8) would be appropriate. The figures given in sources 3 to 6 are for operations "in
hospitals", whereas the numbers in source 1 are forpatients "admitted into hospitals" and
probably, therefore, include those whose operations were performed on the transport ships
between Balaklava and Scutari. There is no quantitative information about the numbers of
amputations carried out on the transports, but the anecdotal evidence cited earlier would
suggest that there were many. It is not clear why the statistical returns in the Hall papers
do not appear to have been available to the authors of the official report, although one
might speculate that the information about the large proportion of cases in which
chloroform was not used could have caused considerable embarrassment.
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1353
Hospitals
1092
1134
Entire war 1134
Entire war
Entire war
925
984
211
777
811
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Medical Opinion at the End ofthe War
Two important sources of opinion at the end of the war are the reports of meetings of
the Crimean Medical and Surgical Society'24 and the official medical history of the
war.125 The reports ofthe Crimean Medical and Surgical Society give opinions ofsixteen
doctors, but it is not known how many others attended these meetings without expressing
an opinion orhaving itrecorded. Some members may have refrained from speaking out if
theirviews conflicted with those ofHall, whochaired three ofthe fourmeetings, and who,
although he had been heavily criticized during the war, was still a man of considerable
influence within the Army Medical Service. The authors of the official history were
determined to counter the allegations of brutality which had been levelled against the
Army Medical Service in general as a result ofHall's original "caution" against the use of
chloroform. In doing so, they may have over-emphasized the opinions of those who
favoured the liberal use of anaesthesia. Ifthe use ofchloroform at the end ofthe war had
fallen to the same level that it had been at the start was this because, despite its being
readily available, surgeons had developed increasing doubts about its value or safety? It
is evident that there was still a significant minority of surgeons who were reluctant to use
anaesthesia, and they gave various reasons to substantiate their practice.
It was still argued that civilian experience was irrelevant to military practice, which
differed in several important respects. For example, Mouat referred to the peaks in
workload which followed a military engagement, pointing out, as had been argued at the
start ofthe war,126 that in these circumstances the extra time required for anaesthetization
and recovery, made it impossible to use chlorbform in every case.127 Mouat still
considered that gunshot wounds were different from the wounds suffered in civilian
practice, and that the shock associated with such wounds was likely to be aggravated by
chloroform. In this context it must be remembered that, to the surgeons of the time, the
term "shock" implied something more thanjust hypovolaemia due to blood loss. Shock,
to the military surgeon
is of a compound nature, in the composition of which the following elements may often be
recognized:
1. The vital effects following all severe injuries.
2. The mechanical effects, probably many and various,
ofthe peculiar velocity and momentum ofthe
impinging force, especially in reference to cannon-
shot injuries.
3. Probably, additional vital effects ofthe above-mentioned
velocity and momentum.
4. Nervous depression, consequent on previous high
nervous tension.
5. Loss ofblood to a considerable extent, sometimes
by a large quantity suddenly effused; sometimes by
a longer process ofgradual drain.
124 Reports ofCrimean Medical and Surgical 126 'Chloroform on the battlefield', op. cit., note
Society, op. cit., notes 19, 28 and 46 above. 16 above.
125 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 127 Report ofCrimean Medical and Surgical
above, Pt 2, pp. 266-72. Society meeting, op. cit., note 28, above, p. 253.
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Practically we find that many never 'rally', to use a technical and often misapplied word, from this
state; and a large number ofpatients died in it. No physical cause can be assigned for these deaths.
Often a very minute quantity ofblood had been lost .. . 128
It is in this context that Hall's original caution against the use ofchloroforml29 must be
considered. Hall, and many other military surgeons, believed that the shock which
followed injury due to gunshot and cannon wounds was different in character from that
which occurred in civilian injuries. Military surgeons also believed that "chloroform is a
powerful depressant of vital action",130 which made it more likely that many patients
would never rally from the type of shock which characterized gunshot injuries. Hall's
opinion remained unchanged throughout the war. Commenting on a case where
chloroform was thought to be the undoubted cause ofdeath, Hall wrote on 14 March 1856:
This was one out of many untoward accidents that have occurred from the use of chloroform
during the war. It proved more immediately fatal, and so attracted special attention; but ifthe cases
where men never rallied, and died within a few hours after its exhibition, were as accurately
detailed, the list would be a long one. But as I have already incurred much public odium for a well-
intentioned, but carelessly worded caution, I am not going to re-open the question, only I feel
authorised in saying that I have seen much to confirm the propriety of that caution, and all candid
and unprejudiced men, I rather think, will admit the same.131
Mouat seems to have concurred with Hall's opinions in every respect when he addressed
the Crimean Medical and Surgical Society. He concluded: "1. That there are states of
shock ... in which chloroform may destroy life in various ways. 2. There are likewise
cases in which, as I have stated, the patient neverfairly rallies, but sinks gradually without
any effort at reaction; these cases are never returned as deaths from chloroform."132
In the discussion which followed Mouat's paper,133 DrGordon concurred with Mouat's
views, and a similar opinion was expressed by an anonymous doctor quoted in the official
medical history ofthe war: "My own impression, from what I have seen ofthe effects of
the drug, is that many ofthese cases died from the exhaustion induced by the shock ofthe
injury and the consequent operation, but that this exhaustion was assisted and kept up in
a most material degree by the depressing influence ofthe chloroform".134
However, of the sixteen doctors who attended and spoke at meetings of the Crimean
Medical and Surgical Society,135 only four (Hall, Mouat, Gordon and Wyatt) believed that
chloroform impaired the patient's ability to rally. Of the remaining twelve, ten were
generally in favour of chloroform and three (Macleod, Bone and George Blenkins)
specifically expressed the view that it actually minimized the effects ofshock, improving
survival and enabling some operations which could not otherwise have been undertaken.
Similar opinions were voiced by others. J H McCowan described an amputation through
the neck ofthe femur which "could not have been performed without an anaesthetic, with
128 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 Society meeting, op. cit., note 19 above, p. 227.
above, pt 2, pp. 265-6. 133 Reports ofCrimean Medical and Surgical
129 Longmore Papers, RAMC 1139, LP 9/11, see Society meetings, op. cit., notes 28 and 46 above.
note 10 above. 134 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21
130 The Times, 13 Oct. 1854, p. 5, col. 5. above, pt 2, p. 267.
131 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 135 See reports ofCrimean Medical and Surgical
above, pt 2, pp. 268-9. Society meetings, op. cit., notes 19, 28 and 46 above.
132 Report ofCrimean Medical and Surgical
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any prospect of the patient surviving the shock",136 and another surgeon, quoted
anonymously in the official report, wrote, "I am of the opinion that the greater the shock
the more useful is chloroform, and the sooner it can be resorted to the better", provided
that "there was arational hope oflifebeing saved by theoperation".137 Thomas Alexander
recorded the case of a patient, quoted by Guthrie, "who was so low when placed on the
table, thatbrandy-and-water was given to him, and he was then immediately placed under
chloroform. When I had finished, it was found that his pulse was stronger than before
commencing the operation",'38 which was for amputation at the shoulder. Such opinions
on the "stimulant" effect of anaesthesia had certainly become the orthodox view in the
USA by 1861.139
When considering the suggestion thatchloroform impaired "rallying", it is relevant that
the depth of anaesthesia which was sometimes used in the Crimea was considerable.
Pyemont Smith wrote that: "Generally speaking, at Scutari, the patient was, by means of
chloroform, brought into the condition of a dead body, and then it was not an operation,
but a dissection that was performed",'40 and the Reverend Sydney Osborne described the
difficulty in arousing one particular patient whom he had anaesthetized.141 Mouat
commented that "Everyone who had witnessed the numerous operations at the General
Hospital [in camp atBalaklava], musthavebeen struck withthe length oftime it was often
necessary to keep the patients on the table, to enable them to rally from the chloroform
insensibility".'42 In these circumstances it would not be surprising if some patients,
weakened not only by their wounds but also often by disease, never recovered from the
operations.
Chloroform was almost invariably administered on lint or a napkin,143 either because
this method was more convenient on the battlefield or because some of the surgeons
thought it safer than inhalers.144 In 1850 about 30 per cent of army surgeons were
Scottish,'45 and would probably have favoured Simpson's method of administration.'46
Florence Nightingale provided two "chloroform instruments" at Scutari during November
orDecember,147 and inhalers were more generally available, certainly by April 1855 when
there were 40 in stock in the Balaklava stores, but only 18 had been issued by the end of
136 J H McCowan, 'An account ofthe wounded of
H.M.'s Fifty-Fifth Regiment', Med. Times Gaz.,
1856, i: 205-6, p. 206.
137 Medical and Surgical History, op. cit., note 21
above, pt 2, p. 267.
138 Longmore Pamphlets, RAMC 423, vol. 5,
Paper 1, see note 27 above.
139 Ibid., Papers 11 and 12.
140 Pyemont Smith, op. cit., note 25 above,
pp. 647-8, p. 648.
141 Osborne, op. cit., note 103 above, pp. 20-1.
142 Report ofMedical and Surgical Society
meeting, op. cit., note 28 above, p. 253.
143 Report ofCrimean Medical and Surgical
Society meeting, op. cit., note 46 above; Osborne,
op. cit., note 103 above; and W H Flower, 'Notes on
surgical practice in the Crimea', Med. Times Gaz.,
1856, i: 308-9.
144 Macleod, op. cit., note 20 above; report of
Crimean Medical and Surgical Society meeting,
op. cit., note 46 above.
145 Shepherd, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 12.
146 Simpson took a considerable personal interest
in the medical aspects ofthe war. He arranged for
both civilian and army medical officers to take out
supplies ofchloroform, and hoped that "you will be
able to show them how to use it properly". Dr
Dowson ofthe Guards incurred Simpson's wrath
because he neither used, nor paid for, the case of
chloroform which Simpson provided. Simpson also
took a personal interest in the planning of the
prefabricated hospital which was erected at Renkioi.
J A Shepherd, Simpson and Syme ofEdinburgh,
Edinburgh and London, E and S Livingstone, 1969,
pp. 116-20.
147 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above,
pp. 33-4.
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March 1856,148 ofthese only two wenttohospitals, the remainderbeing given todivisions
or regiments.
The "more immediately fatal" case to which Hall referred occurred on 25 August 1855
and was described in detail.149 The patientrequired amputation ofhis index fingerand the
chloroform, which "was administered with his own consent, as he seemed to dread the
operation", was given on lint.
As the anaesthesia became more complete and the operation about to be commenced, it was
observed that he did not breathe freely . . . The chloroform was immediately removed, but
respiration could not be observed; a current of air was admitted and water dashed on the face, and
ammonia held to the nostrils, but the pulse had ceased. Artificial respiration was had recourse to,
and kept up for a long time, but without effect. The heart's action continued for some time after the
pulse failed and respiration ceased.
The death was officially attributed to impurities in the chloroform, a sample ofwhich was
analysed some time later in Edinburgh and found to be "totally unfit for use, being in a
state of complete decomposition". However, the nature of the incident, occurring in a
frightened patient, soon after induction and before the operation began, is typical of the
cardiac effects associated with chloroform when given in too great a concentration, as
described by Snow. Although the case report stated that the chloroform was given in such
a way "as to admit a large quantity ofatmospheric air", Snow had realized that "the most
fatal error with regard to chloroform has been to suppose that the patient was safe so long
as he was supplied with sufficient air for the purposes ofrespiration; for the truth is, that
the more airthe patientbreathes, the greateris his danger, ifthe airbe overhighly charged
with the vapour".150 The statement in the case report that the "heart's action continued for
some time after the pulse had failed" is not, of course, compatible with ventricular
fibrillation due to chloroform because it presumably implies that heart sounds were heard
after the pulse could no longer be felt. Ifcorrect, this could indicate atoxic effect ofsome
chemical other than chloroform. However, it is equally probable that this was a cardiac
death due to over-exposure to chloroform, which might have been prevented by the use of
one of Snow's inhalers which were already available in the Crimea.
The suggestion that wounds and shock seen in military practice differed in some way
from those in civilian practice, as proposed by Hall in his original caution in 1854, and
still argued by Mouat in 1856,151 was rejected by the majority ofthose who expressed an
opinion at the end of the war. The most vocal of these was Macleod, who reiterated his
views time and timeagain,152 buthe was supported byothers.153 Macleod alsorecognized
148 RAMC 397, FRS 2/2, 2/3, 2/4 and 2/Sa, see in anaesthesia: Alfred Goodman Levy and
note 30 above. chloroform death, 1910-1960', in C Lawrence (ed.),
149 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 Medical theory, surgicalpractice, London and New
above, pt 2, pp. 268-9. York, Routledge, 1992, pp. 263-4.
150J Snow, 'Chloroform in London and 151 Report ofCrimean Medical and Surgical
Edinburgh', Lancet, 1855, i: 108-9; idem, 'Further Society meeting, op. cit., note 19 above.
remarks on the cause and prevention ofdeath from 152 Ibid., op. cit., note 28 above, p. 253, and note
chloroform', Lancet, 1856, i: 148-50, p. 150. The 46 above, p. 377; and Macleod, op. cit., note 20
exact mode of sudden death due to chloroform has above, p. 992.
remained the subject ofdebate between experimental 153 Ibid., op. cit., note 46 above, p. 378; and
physiologists and clinicians; for a recent, detailed Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 above,
review see C Lawrence, 'Experiment and experience pt 2, p. 267.
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that chloroform "has certainly thrown a very great weight into the scale in favour of
primary amputation. The fear ofrenewing the shock, which deterred so many from early
operation, is now completely removed".154 This confirmation of Snow's prediction in
1847'55 was an important consideration because mortality following primary amputations
in Field Hospitals was only 23 per cent, compared with secondary amputations, where the
mortality was 59 per cent in Field Hospitals and 64 per cent at Scutari.156 It was also
recognized that anaesthesia made possible the more lengthy and complex operations such
as excisions,157 but argument remained about the use ofapotentially lethal agent in minor
operations. Of six doctors whose opinions are recorded four were against using
chloroform for amputations of fingers and two were in favour.158 The official medical
history concluded that "the majority [ofsurgeons] believe the use ofthis anaesthetic agent
desirable in all cases, both of severe and slight wounds requiring operations ... that a few
partially concur in this view; but object to its use in minor operations . . ."s.159 However,
the evidence in Table 7 suggests that only a minority used it in minor operations, and it
was used in only about two-thirds of major operations. Concern over the use of
chloroform forminoroperations was not confined to military surgeons; Augustin Prichard
in Bristol,160 for example, shared this worry, though his arguments were rejected by
Snow.161
Guthrie, writing in 1861, was of the opinion that chloroform "may be administered in
all cases of amputation of the upper extremity and below the knee, and in all minor
operations". He was less certain about its use in amputations ofthe middle and upperparts
of the thigh, commenting that "the question whether it should or should not be
administered in such cases being undecided".'62 Amputations at the middle and upper
thirds ofthe thigh certainly carried ahigher mortality than loweramputations,'63 but there
does not seem to have been any evidence that this was due to chloroform.
Anaesthesia in the British Navy and
in the French and Russian Armies
The use of chloroform by naval surgeons during the Crimean War has been reviewed
by P A Glew.164 No official advice, comparable to Hall's memorandum, was given to
naval surgeons, but they were instructed that chloroform should be available when the
ship was cleared for action, and all ships were provided with twice the usual quantity.
Even so, the stocks proved inadequate.
154 G H B Macleod, 'Surgery ofthe Crimean 159 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21
War', Edinb. med. J., 1856, 1: 1063-87, esp. pp. above, pt. 2, p. 272.
1081 and 1086. 160 A Prichard, 'Death from chloroform', Br. med.
155 Snow, op. cit., note 1 above. J., 1858, i: 207-8.
156 RAMC 397, FRM 1i7b, see note 30 above. 161 J Snow, 'Death from chloroform', Br. med. J.,
157 Report ofCrimean Medical and Surgical 1858, i: 279.
Society meeting, op. cit., note 28 above, p. 253. 162 Longmore Pamphlets, RAMC 423, Paper 11.
158 Reports ofCrimean Medical and Surgical 163 RAMC 397, FRM 1/7b, see note 30 above.
Society meetings, op. cit., notes 28 and 46 above; 164 P A Glew, 'Anaesthesia and the Royal Navy
also Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 1847 to 1856', History ofAnaesthesia Society Proc.,
above, pt 2, pp. 266 and 272. 1991, 10: 22-32.
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In the early part of the war French military surgeons appear to have shared the
reservations of some of their British colleagues regarding the use of chlorofonn. For
example, Macleodcommentedthat"theFrench, too, seemedshyofit, andIhaveheard some
ofthemhintatits being afruitful sourceofsecondaryhaemorrhage";165 andWilliamFlower
wrote that "the French surgeons seemed also to have entertained a dislike to the use of
chloroform atthecommencementofthe war; forIobserveditwas veryrarely givenby them
in the operations after the battle of the Alma. Whether further experience has led them to
modify theirviews on the subject, Ihavenotbeenable toascertain".166 However, inthebase
hospital ofDolmar-Bagtche in Constantinople, Professor Mounier claimed that chloroform
was used in all the cases brought there from the battles ofAlma and Inkerman,167just as it
was in the British base hospitals in Scutari.168 Whether chloroform was used invariably in
all the French base hospitals is uncertain, but Macleod, writing six years afterthe end ofthe
war, commented that "although the French used it very extensively ... still I do not think,
from what I saw ofits employment in theirhospitals, that they had our confidence in it".169
Despite Macleod's comments, the French usage was very considerable, for Macleod quotes
a French calculation to the effect that during the Eastern campaign chloroform was
employed in 30,000 cases or more, of which 20,000 were in the Crimea itself. Thirty
thousand cases would, at a rate of2 ounces percase,170 require 3750 lbs ofchloroform; by
comparison it can be calculated, from the dates on shipments and stocks of chloroform
quoted earlierin this paper, thatthe British used, atmost, only 536 lbs. However, the French
suffered many more casualties than did the British; there were 4698 amputations among the
French soldiers,171 compared with a maximum of 1353 in the British army. Even allowing
for this difference, it would appear that the French, perhaps after some initial qualms as
described by Macleod and Flowers, used chloroform more liberally than did the British.
The Russians probably used anaesthesia much more extensively than either the British
or the French. An anonymous correspondent to the Lancet was told by Russian medical
officers who were captured after the surrender of Bomarsund that "they perform every
operation with chloroform, no matter how trivial it might be".172 This statement is
corroborated in the writings of Pirogov, the senior Russian surgeon in Sebastopol, who
used anaesthetics not only for operations but also for examinations where no operation
was planned.173
Selective Anaesthesia-an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon?
To those of us living at the end of the twentieth century it may come as a surprise to
find that, eight or nine years after its introduction, anaesthesia was not in universal use
throughout the Crimean War. It cannot have been due to ignorance for, although the
surgeons of the British army in the mid-nineteenth century spent much of their
165 Macleod, op. cit., note 20 above, p. 992. 1862, pp. 123-6.
166 Fower, op. cit., note 143 above, p. 309. 170 Shepherd, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 132.
167 Prof. Mounier, 'On the employment of 171 Macleod, op. cit., note 169 above, Appendix H,
chloroform in the army in the east', Med. imqs p. 371.
Gaz., 1855, i: 605. 172 Anon., 'The war-from a correspondent',
168 Osborne, op. cit., note 103 above. Lancet, 1854,ii: 223-4.
169 G H B Macleod, Notes on the surgery ofthe 173 T Sorokina, personal communication.
war in the Crimea, 2nd ed. London, John Churchill,
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professional careers abroad and often in remote areas, many were frequent contributors to
medicaljournals. Moreover, by the second half of the war, they must all have had many
opportunities of witnessing anaesthesia at first hand and of learning the techniques from
others, even if they had no previous practical experience. Concerns about the use of
anaesthesia in the "shock" which followed severe gun-shot wounds, andoftherisk-benefit
ratio in more minorinjuries, were matters ofprofessionaljudgement which must also have
exercised the minds of the French and Russian surgeons; why then did the British
surgeons use chloroform less liberally than their French and Russian counterparts? The
answer to this question lies, perhaps, in different social and cultural perceptions of pain,
rather than in any difference in professional judgements. In mid-nineteenth-century
America, another country with at that time a predominantly Anglo-Saxon population,
Pernick has shown how the use of anaesthesia was influenced by the age, sex, ethnicity
and occupation of the patient.174 Thus adolescents and adults were less likely to receive
anaesthesia than children or the elderly, men less likely than women, immigrants less
likely than those born in America, and sailors and labourers less likely than those in all
other occupations. At the Massachusetts General Hospital, anaesthesia was used for all
major amputations, but the private records of Dr F H Hamilton show that between 1849
and 1877 he used anaesthesia for major limb amputations in only 74 per cent of males
aged between 11 and 74 years, and at the Pennsylvania Hospital between 1853 and 1862
only 67 per cent of males with "fracture amputations" were anaesthetized. These
percentages are similar to the 76 per cent of British soldiers who were anaesthetized for
major amputations during the Crimean War. Indeed, when one considers that the data
collected by Pernick relate to all males, whatever their occupation, and that seamen and
labourers in the Hamilton and Pennsylvania series were less likely to receive anaesthesia
than those in all other occupations, the rate of usage among British soldiers is probably
greater than in these two American series.
In the first halfofthe nineteenth century soldiers were expected to be able to withstand
pain, and Pernick suggests that it was only in the mid-1850s that Anglo-American
textbooks of surgery and medicine began to reject this notion and to suggest that soldiers
merited anaesthesia on the same terms as didother men. Thus, during the warwith Mexico
(1846-1848) the chief surgeon of the American hospital at Vera Cruz claimed that
chloroform was unnecessary on the field of battle, and he prevented a civilian surgeon
from using chloroform inhis hospital. Thirteen years later, during the American Civil War
(1861-1865), attitudes had begun to change, though Pernick quotes Louisa May Alcott,
who described how one surgeon, a veteran of the Crimean War, used ether only for
amp'utations, and how a soldier's chances of receiving anaesthesia varied greatly
depending on the opinions ofthe medical offlcer on duty.
Were British soldiers less likely to receive anaesthesia than their non-military
compatriots at the time ofthe Crimean War? If selective anaesthesia was being practised,
then differences might be found between military and non-military men in the use of
anaesthesia for dental extractions which, although painful, are usually relatively briefand
minor procedures. This hypothesis can be tested by examining the Casebooks ofDrJohn
174 M S Pemick, A calculus ofsuffering, New pp. 150-1, 176-7, 181-5, 190-5, and Appendix,
York, Columbia University Press, 1985, esp. pp. 249-61.
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Snow, which cover the period from 17 July 1848 to 5 June 1858.175 The data shown in
Table 9 compares the number of anaesthetics given by Snow for dental and non-dental
procedures in soldiers and sailors with those given to non-military men. Military and naval
patients were identified either by the mention ofa rank (e.g. captain or general), orby the
description ofthe patient as a soldier or sailor, orby the operation having taken place in a
military hospital. Children under the age of sixteen years have been excluded from the
analysis. The use of anaesthesia for dental procedures was similar in military and naval
patients (9.2 per cent of all anaesthetics) to that in non-military and non-naval men (11.6
per cent), even though the average number of teeth extracted at each procedure was
smaller in the military and naval men. This data does not support the hypothesis that
British soldiers and sailors were less likely to receive anaesthesia for minor procedures
than their civilian colleagues.176 It is, however, ofinterest that seven ofthe thirteen dental
anaesthetics in the military and naval men were given in just one year, between 17 July
1856 and 16 July 1857. Thus in the eight years before the end ofthe Crimean War dental
anaesthetics accounted for4.8 per cent ofthe total, and in the subsequent two years for 21
per cent ofall anaesthetics in military and naval men (Chi2 = 8.7, 2p <0.02). Whether this
difference reflects a greater demand for anaesthesia among soldiers who had witnessed its
use in the Crimea, or a greater prevalence ofdental caries after two years ofthe hardships
of war cannot be determined from this data.
Table 9
Dental and non-dental anaesthetics given by Dr John Snow
Civilian Men Military and naval men
Non-dental Dental Non-dental Dental
All cases (n) 1363 179 129 13
Dental cases as % of all cases 11.6 9.2
Average number ofteeth extracted 3.1 1.8
Excluding cases where >3 teeth extracted:
n 116 12
as % of all cases 7.8 8.5
175 R H Ellis (ed.), The case books ofDrJohn
Snow, Medical History, Supplement No. 14, London,
Wellcome Institute for the History ofMedicine,
1994. As Ellis points out in his Introduction, the
Case Books are not a totally comprehensive record
of Snow's anaesthetic workload, but they probably
document the great majority ofthe anaesthetics
which he gave from mid-July 1848 until his death.
Only the cases described in his Case Books are
included in this analysis; details ofother cases can be
found in the bibliography ofSnow's publications in:
D A E Shephard, John Snow: anaesthetist to a queen
and epidemiologist to a nation, Cornwall, Canada,
York Point Publishing, 1995, Appendix II,
pp. 299-304.
176 It is not possible to make similar comparisons
between men and women using Snow's case records,
because the nature ofthe non-dental anaesthetics is
very different between the two sexes, and also
because women had a greater number ofteeth
extracted under each anaesthetic (3.9 compared with
3.0).
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What of the soldiers' own wishes as to whether they should be given anaesthesia?
References to this subject in the Crimean War are scanty and anecdotal. In the case ofthe
patient who died under anaesthesia the chloroform seems to have been given at the
soldier's own express request,'77 and acorrespondent to the Lancetmentioned that "many
of the poor fellows were cunning enough to ask for chloroform".'78 Whether any of the
patients refused chloroform is not recorded, although a few soldiers did so at the time of
the second Anglo-Boer war nearly fifty years later.179
Medical Opinion in later Years
In 1875 Surgeon-Major Joshua Porter published The surgeon's pocket book-being an
essay on the besttreatment ofthe wounded in war. Porterhad battlefield experience in the
Crimea, during the Indian mutiny, and in the Franco-German war of 1870-71, and at the
time of publishing his book was assistant professor of military surgery in the Army
Medical School at Netley. It is therefore probable that his opinions were respected and
represented orthodox thinking among the army surgeons of the time. Porter advised that,
when possible, chloroform should be used forall operations, and even fordressing painful
wounds. Among the usual precautions which should be observed when using chloroform
he included the "wishes of the patient". Whether this was an injunction to any surgeons
who did not routinely use chloroform to give it if it was requested by the patient, or
whether it was meant to imply that chloroform should be omitted if the patient did not
wish it, is not clear from the text. He stated categorically that chloroform "decidedly
relieves the nervous shock" inrecently wounded soldiers. So valuable waschloroform that
it "and other anaesthetics should be most carefully treasured by the army surgeon and no
waste allowed. It is sometimes difficult to procure it in sufficient quantity, especially after
severe engagements, when every drop is worth its weight in gold".'80
During the Crimean War it would seem that chloroform was the only anaesthetic agent
which was used,181 but Porter's mention of "other anaesthetics" implies that it was no
longer the sole anaesthetic in use by the army in 1875. He goes on to say that he, himself,
had frequently used ether and found it highly satisfactory. Ether had the reputation,
especially among Americans, ofbeing much saferthanchloroform, butthe greatervolume
required to produce anaesthesia and the necessity of carrying a bulky inhaler for its
administration were disadvantages on active service. Porter suggested that it was a matter
fordebate as to whether these disadvantages should prevent its use in warfare, noting that,
"our combatant brethren never hesitate to transport enormous implements of
destruction!".
In 1878 the Surgeon General's Office in Simla published memoranda for the use of
Medical Officers in the British Forces which included details of stocks of chloroform to
be held at regimental and divisional levels (Table 10). Regimental stocks were twice as
177 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21 Charles Griffin, 1875, pp. 151-2.
above, pt 2, pp. 268-9. 181 The only mention ofether in either official
178 Anon., 'The war', Lancet, 1855, i: 22. records or injournal reports or books is of the 8 oz
179 B Hovell, 'Anaesthesia and the siege of in the stocks on board the Australian (Table 6); and
Ladysmith', History ofAnaesthesia Society Proc., there are no records of its actual use as an
1994, 15: 55-8. anaesthetic agent during the Crimean War.
180 J H Porter, Thesurgeon's pocket book, London,
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Table JO
Recommended regimental and divisional stocks ofchloroform in 1854 and 1878
1854a l878b
Regimental 0 lb =8 oz 1 lb=Ooz
Divisional
Field Hospital 10 lb =O oz
10 lOb= oz
Base Hospital J 20 lb =0 oz
Sources: aLancet, 1854, ii: 517-18. RAMC 397 FRS 1/2, 1/13a and 1/15, see note 30 above.
bLongmore Pamphlets, RAMC 423, vol. 5, Paper 32, see note 27 above.
great and divisional stocks three times greater than during the Crimean War, which
suggests that anaesthesia was now more generally used and that previous stock levels had
proved inadequate. No mention was made of other anaesthetic agents, so it seems
probable that chloroform was still considered to be the recommended anaesthetic in the
British army. The increasing use of anaesthesia in the army during these years mirrored
what was happening in civilian practice, and was probably the result of changing social
concepts, influenced both by the evangelical abhorrence of unnecessary pain and by a
more pragmatic, Benthamite approach to scientific progress.'82
Although concerns about aggravating shock and "failure to rally" from chloroform
appear to have disappeared in the years after the Crimean War, they resurfaced during the
First World War (1914-18). In a manual published in 1918, army surgeons were advised
to avoid chloroform in septic cases requiring amputation "as it is often followed by a slow
fall of blood pressure, which ends in death during the twelve hours succeeding
operation".183 Gas and oxygen was recommended as the method ofchoice in such cases,
though spinal anaesthesia, warm ether vapour and intravenous ether were regarded as
comparatively safe alternatives.
Conclusions
At the start ofthe war British army surgeons had little experience ofusing anaesthesia
in patients with gunshot wounds, and opinion was divided about the possible "depressive"
effect ofchloroform in such injuries. During the first three months ofthe war, chloroform
was used in only 60 per cent of all amputations and in 66 per cent of major amputations.
Lack of availability of chloroform, especially at regimental level and on transport ships,
was probably the major reason for its low usage at this time; John Hall's caution against
its use probably had only a limited impact and then only in divisions or regiments where
the opinions ofthe senior medical officers concurred with his.
182 C Lawrence, 'Democratic, divine and heroic: 183 Anon., Injuries and diseases ofwar, London,
the history and historiography of surgery', in HMSO, 1918, p. 48.
Lawrence (ed.), op. cit., note 150 above, pp. 1-48.
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During the second quarter of the war chloroform was used in 95 per cent of all
amputations and 100 per cent of major amputations. At this time, during the winter
months, there was little fighting and operations were few in number. Supplies of
chloroform were obviously adequate for the relatively small demand, and medical staff
had sufficient time to use anaesthesia. However, these considerations also applied during
the last three months ofthe war, and the high rates ofuse during the first quarter of 1855
may also have been influenced by public reaction at home to the publication of Hall's
memorandum and general concern about the plight ofthe British soldier in the Crimea.
After March 1855 the use of anaesthesia declined progressively, and by the end of the
war was at the same level as it had been at the start. Low rates ofusage at times ofintense
fighting, for example, during the final attack on the Malakoff and Redan redoubts in
September 1855, may have resulted from temporary, local shortages of chloroform, even
though total stocks were ample, and from pressure ofwork. However these considerations
did not apply between October and December 1855, when the surgical workload was
relatively light and there were no sudden peaks due to major military actions. Medical
opinion and practice must have been the major determinants of chloroform usage at this
time.
By the end of the war most surgeons no longer believed that chloroform had a
"depressant" effect in shock, and some realized that, as Snow had predicted in 1847, the
relief of pain had a positively beneficial effect in apparently poor risk patients, thereby
permitting primary operations whichcarried lowermortality rates thandelayed, secondary
procedures. However, a significant minority, probably about athird ofarmy surgeons, still
considered that chloroform had a depressant effect which contributed to "failure to rally"
from an operation; these surgeons were generally averse to using chloroform in
amputations which carried a high mortality, such as those in the thigh. There was still
considerable reluctance to use chloroform for minor operations where the injury itself
posed no risk to life.
The official medical history of the war omitted all mention of quantitative data about
the use of chloroform, and was phrased in such a way as to suggest that anaesthesia had
been practised more widely than was the case. This probably reflects continuing
sensitivity to the general criticisms to which the Army Medical Service had been
subjected during the war, and also a reluctance to give information which might lead to a
revival ofpublic discussion about Hall's caution on the use ofchloroform.
In contrast to American practice in the mid-nineteenth century, there is no known
surviving evidence to suggest that British soldiers and sailors were less likely to receive
anaesthesia than were civilian men. The British usage of anaesthesia during the Crimean
War was similar to that in contemporary American civilian practice, though lower than
that in the Russian army in the Crimea, and probably lower than in the French army.
In the years following the war, the use ofanaesthesia by British army surgeons appears
to have increased; by the mid-1870s military surgeons were officially advised to use
chloroform whenever possible, and the stocks held at regimental and divisional levels had
been increased two- to three-fold. The increase in the use of anaesthesia mirrored what
was happening in civilian practice at this time.
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